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Abstract 
Most groups in violent, intergroup conflict perceive themselves to be the primary or sole 
victims of that conflict.  This often results in contention over who may claim victim status 
and complicates a central aim of post-conflict processes, which is to acknowledge and 
address harms experienced by the victims.  Drawing from victimology scholarship and 
intergroup relations theory, this article proposes the victim-perpetrator paradigm as a 
framework to analyse how, why and to what end groups in conflict construct and maintain 
their claims to the moral status of victim.  This interdisciplinary paradigm builds on the 
knowledge that groups utilise the ‘ideal victim’ construction to exemplify their own 
innocence and blamelessness in contrast to the wickedness of the perpetrator, setting the 
two categories as separate and mutually exclusive even where experiences of violence 
have been complex.  Additionally, this construction provides for a core intergroup need 
to achieve positive social identity, which groups may enhance by demonstrating a 
maximum differentiation between the in-group as victims and those out-groups identified 
as perpetrators.  The paradigm contributes greater knowledge on the social roots of victim 
contention in conflict, as well as how groups legitimise their violence against out-groups 
during and after conflict. 
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Introduction 
 Societies emerging from violent conflict around the world face a growing 
obligation to develop processes that serve to build peace and prevent a return to violence.  
Across the many ‘post-conflict’ mechanisms and systems designed to consolidate peace, 
a core assumption persists that acknowledging harms done to victims and holding 
perpetrators of those harms to account is paramount, and that victims should play a 
fundamental role in these processes (Brewer, 2010; Hayner, 2011; Huyse, 2003; Karstedt, 
2010).  These contexts, however, often produce competing claims to victimhood which 
complicate this imperative: ‘in every serious, harsh and violent intergroup conflict, at 
least one side – and often both sides – believe that they are the victim in that conflict’ 
(Bar-Tal et al., 2009: 229-230).  Furthermore, group claims to victim status often 
accompany a denial of opposing groups’ experiences of harm and the labelling of these 
other groups collectively as perpetrators.  In a very practical sense, these exclusive claims 
to the be the primary or only victim in conflict leads to difficulty in identifying victims 
and addressing their needs (Jankowitz, 2017), undermining this central tenet of most 
peacebuilding and transitional justice (TJ) processes.  While much research has been 
dedicated constructions of victimhood and the prevalence of intergroup processes in 
violent conflict respectively, a more joined up understanding of how the two interact may 
address questions about how, why and to what end groups make exclusive claims to 
victim status. 
  4 
To better articulate these dynamics, this article develops the victim-perpetrator 
paradigm as a framework through which to analyse and understand conflicting 
perceptions of victims and perpetrators in intergroup conflict, and to address questions of 
how and why groups often go to great lengths to maintain their claims to be the genuine 
or ‘real’ victims.  The paradigm builds upon existing theories including John Brewer’s 
‘multiple victimhood’ (2010), which describes how widespread violence creates an 
environment wherein most groups can be labelled as both victims and perpetrators, and 
Anthony Oberschall’s ‘double victim syndrome’ (2007), which connects a group’s 
identification as victims with the denial of both their own violence and the victimhood of 
adversary groups.  Crucially, the victim-perpetrator paradigm draws from both 
sociological theories about the construction of victimhood, primarily those residing in 
victimology scholarship, and theories relating to the more social psychological inquiry 
into intergroup relations.   In particular, these engage with social constructionist aspects 
of victimology and intergroup processes inherent in conflicts that occur at the group level.  
Together, these insights contribute to the victim-perpetrator paradigm, which describes 
how groups, primarily in contexts of intergroup conflict, utilise favourable constructions 
of the ‘victim’ to emphasise their in-group primacy in comparison to out-groups which 
are perceived collectively as ‘perpetrators’.  
This article begins with a review of well-established debates in the field of 
victimology on the social construction of victimhood, and specifically addresses the role 
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of social construction in how groups develop collective perceptions of ‘victims’ and 
‘perpetrators’ around binary distinctions of innocence and guilt, good and bad, legitimacy 
and illegitimacy.  This follows with an examination of intergroup relations theory, which 
resonates with the victim-perpetrator paradigm.  In particular, this section sets up the 
argument that groups develop parallel, ethnocentric self-images of themselves as victims 
in order to distinguish themselves positively from groups perceived to be collectively 
responsible for violence, in turn connecting a sense of victimhood with a positive social 
identity.  A brief section then pulls engages with several problematic ways the victim-
perpetrator paradigm adds to the intractability of conflict while violence is on-going as 
well as during processes to address past violence and build peace. The article concludes 
by discussing the contribution the victim-perpetrator paradigm may offer scholarship 
relating to issues of victimhood, violence, conflict transformation and TJ.   
My development of the victim-perpetrator paradigm grew out of a conceptual gap 
I identified over the course of conducting research into group perceptions of victims in 
Northern Ireland, and the impact of these perceptions on processes to build peace in the 
wake of the local conflict.  For that reason, the paradigm is designed specifically in 
response to the unique circumstances and characteristics of violent, intergroup conflict 
that lend to exclusive and intractable understandings of victimhood and responsibility.  In 
order to better set the stage for subsequent discussion, it is useful to first briefly outline 
these characteristics, which include the collective experience of violence, the 
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mobilisation of group identities and the decidedly negative, hostile relationship between 
groups. 
Intergroup conflict is an overwhelmingly collective experience, where 
relationships between groups are characterised by violence that is directed towards people 
not because of their individual qualities or identities, but because of their membership in 
particular groups (Brewer, 2010: 12).   Violence in such conflicts ‘has been used by two 
or more groups against each other and there will be victims, perpetrators, bystanders and 
beneficiaries on all sides’ (Govier, 2006: 22).  This collective experience of violence 
permeates social groups and transcends the individual: ‘Of course, communal violence is 
against the person in that an individual Catholic or an individual Tutsi is a victim, but it 
is their identity as a member of the group that explains their victimhood’ (Brewer, 2010: 
12; see also White, 2003).  Significantly, the collective nature of violence in intergroup 
conflicts is ‘particularly powerful and binding of the individual to the group’ (Smyth, 
2007: 68).  This mobilises group identities and encourages individuals to view one 
another ‘primarily in terms of whether they belong to the in-group or the out-group’ 
(Stephan, 2008: 374).  Interactions between in-group and out-group members are 
therefore determined largely by their group attributes and affiliations:  
…the more intense is an intergroup conflict, the more likely it is that the 
individuals who are members of the opposing groups will behave towards each 
other as a function of their respective group memberships, rather than in terms 
  7 
of their individual characteristics or interindividual relationships. (Tajfel & 
Turner, 2001: 95) 
Because these interactions are based primarily on group membership, intergroup conflict 
and its associated attitudes and behaviours are seen as a reflection of a wider social 
structure that takes into account group boundaries, beliefs and attitudes about conflict, 
and individuals’ desire to be part of groups that contribute to their sense of self-esteem 
and belonging.  The collective, group-based nature of this type of violence begs a closer 
interrogation of the relationship between the individual and the group in order to 
understand how the constructions of victimhood and responsibility discussed earlier 
interact with intergroup attitudes, beliefs and behaviours within the social structures of 
intergroup conflict.  The victim-perpetrator paradigm offers one way to approach the 
often contradictory and always emotionally-laden dynamics presented by violence in 
these settings. 
  
Social construction of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ 
It has long been the subject of debate within victimology that ‘victim’ is not an 
objective label, nor is victimisation an objective experience (Mawby & Walklate, 1995; 
Mendelsohn, 1994; Quinney, 1972; Viano, 1989; Wolfgang, 1957).  Rather, in 
recognising that victim identification relies on subjective values and beliefs, victimology 
presents victimhood as a socially constructed, interactional concept that resonates with 
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beliefs about innocence, responsibility and context.  These insights have begun to 
permeate the fields of TJ and peacebuilding, encouraging more critical analysis of the 
socio-political, legal, cultural and personal factors that influence beliefs about victims in 
violent conflict (Huyse, 2003; McEvoy & McConnachie, 2012).  Dominant literature in 
these multidisciplinary fields, however, continues to engage the notion of ‘victim’ as 
uncomplicated in debates over how to reckon with past violence.  This section outlines 
prominent arguments about the processes of social construction involved in developing 
beliefs about victims and perpetrators, and demonstrates how these constructed beliefs 
imbue those labelled ‘victims’ with a range of favourable characteristics that exemplify a 
sense of their morality and goodness.   
 Social constructionist schools of thought indicate that social processes construct 
knowledge and beliefs that individuals and groups use to organise a coherent and 
meaningful reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).  The lessons and patterns developed in 
victimology scholarship resonate strongly with social constructionism, and in particular 
the assertion that the concept of victimhood itself is subjective and constructed in social 
interaction.  Victimologist Richard Quinney asserts that ‘our conceptions of victimization 
are optional, discretionary, and by no means innately given […] in the larger social 
context, we all engage in commonsense construction of “the crime,” “the criminal,” and 
“the victim”’ (1972: 314).  Holstein and Miller (1990: 105) similarly argue that 
victimhood is produced through rhetoric and discourses of victimisation; perceptions of 
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victimhood ‘are reflexive in the sense that they both instruct observers in how to 
appreciate the situationally specific meanings of persons as “victims” and simultaneously 
invoke and create those meanings’ (Holstein & Miller, 1990: 105).  This process 
proliferates a conventional wisdom about victimhood and becomes a routine process to 
label those we perceive as suffering from harm as ‘victim’, without thinking critically 
about how ‘we gloss the interpretive procedures through which the term is selected, 
applied, and justified’ (Quinney, 1972: 321).  
Tracing the construction of the ‘victim’, Holstein and Miller frame victimisation 
as an interactional phenomenon.  They argue that beliefs about victimhood stem from a 
context and interaction that involves both the victim and the action or actor that caused 
harm; in order for a victim to exist there must be a source of harm, and in order for an 
action to be considered harmful there must be a victim who has experienced harm.  
Processes of victimhood are therefore ‘contingent upon features of both victimizer and 
victim’ (Holstein & Miller, 1990: 103).  Quinney elaborates the innate relationship 
between construction of the victim and attribution of responsibility for harm by arguing 
that, ‘acts… are defined as criminal because someone or something is conceived as a 
victim’ (1972: 315).  Once the wrongfulness of an act is enshrined in law, victims are 
constructed in a way that instructs observers to consider how that person has been the 
object, not the source, of harmful behaviour and innately locates responsibility elsewhere: 
‘Calling someone a victim encourages others to see how the labelled person has be
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harmed by forces outside his or her control, simultaneously establishing the “fact” of 
injury and locating responsibility outside the “victim”’ (Holstein & Miller, 1990: 106, see 
also Goodey, 2005: 2).  An inherent parallel can therefore be traced between beliefs about 
victimhood and beliefs about responsibility that are reflected in the ‘binary, one-
dimensional terms’ of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ that often simplify the experience of 
harm in violent conflict (Lawther, 2014a: 10).  Asserting that the victim is not the source 
of harm implies that someone or something else must be: ‘the assignment of victim status 
to persons is sometimes associated with the assignment of victimizer status to others’ 
(Holstein & Miller, 1990: 107).  The victim and the perpetrator, then, are inherently tied 
to one another as complementary opposites (Bouris, 2007).1 
The ‘ideal victim’ is the dominant concept that describes what types of individuals 
are ‘most readily are given the complete and legitimate status of being a victim’ (Christie, 
1986: 18).  A concept first identified by Nils Christie (1986) in the field of critical 
victimology and later elaborated in the context of political violence and peacebuilding by 
Erica Bouris (2007), the ideal victim dominates discourse on victims of criminal 
wrongdoing, violent conflict, humanitarian disaster and other interactions where harm – 
real or perceived – is inflicted.  Several key assumptions are attached to the ideal victim 
image, forming what Bouris calls a ‘constellation’ of characteristics that construct the 
                                                        
1 The complex relationship between victim and perpetrator is the subject of debate from 
a range of perspectives, such as restorative justice scholarship which straddles local and 
international responses to violence and victimisation (see for example Braithwaite, 1989). 
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victim as innocent, unjustly harmed, and deserving of care, sympathy and support (2007: 
32).  This image conveys powerful moral meanings about the inherent ‘goodness’ of the 
victim, supported by the construction of the victim as the object, never the source, of 
harm.  Moreover, these attributes appear to extend beyond the instance of victimisation 
in what Trudy Govier (2006: 29) calls a ‘paradigmatic act’, to render lasting judgements 
about the character of the victim based on the particular interaction in which he or she is 
harmed.  The ideal victim also embodies the interactional nature of victimhood, directing 
society to understand and identify the source of harm as external to the victim and 
reinforcing the dichotomy between victims and perpetrators by mapping the labels across 
notions of good and bad, innocence and guilt, morality and immorality.  
The incontrovertible notion of innocence tied to the ideal victim image 
communicates beliefs about the victim’s inherently moral nature, and in the context of 
conflict innocence also acts as a descriptor of one’s role in violence.  A chain of 
equivalence is assumed so that, ‘To be a real victim is to be an innocent victim, and 
anything less than innocence problematizes being recognised as a “real victim”’ (Bouris, 
2007: 39).  Attaching to victims the concept of innocence directly invokes the language 
of responsibility and reflects back to the interactional nature of victimhood; if one party, 
the victim, is wholly innocent, there must be another whom is wholly guilty.  To question 
the victims’ innocence complicates beliefs about the harmful interaction, and 
subsequently undermines society’s ability to attribute blame solely upon the perpetrator.   
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The ideal victim image resonates with and reinforces a simplistic narrative of 
‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ that portrays victims and perpetrators as separate, distinct and 
mutually exclusive (Borer, 2003).  Insofar as the ideal victim label is associated with 
assumptions about an individual’s morality, the perpetrator label is constructed as 
inherently tied with clear perceptions of wrongfulness and immorality.  Innocence and 
responsibility are rendered mutually dependent insofar as the morality and ‘goodness’ of 
the victim inversely relates to the ultimate responsibility and guilt of the ‘wicked’ 
perpetrator (Lawther, 2014b).  This ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ aspect of public discourse 
also provides victims with validation of the ‘blamelessness in their suffering, maintaining 
the myopic view of the wrongfulness of a perpetrator’ (Moffett, 2014: 10).  
Demonstrating that ‘there is an identified, concrete and specific perpetrator… who has to 
be punished for his act’ (Bar-Tal, 2003: 83) offers victims an unquestionable sense of 
their own innocence and moral standing.  This favourable sense of self, derived from 
assumptions about the innocence and morality of the victim, play a central role in the 
framework of the victim-perpetrator paradigm. 
Crucially in terms of instrumentalising victims’ innocence, labelling an individual 
or a group in such a way directs society to view them not only according to accepted 
beliefs about innocence and morality, but also to feel that the harmed party did not deserve 
their fate.  Some scholars argue that harm being ‘unjust’ or undeserved is indeed a 
qualification for victim status:  
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The mere experience of the harmful event is not enough for the emergence of the 
sense of being a victim. […] In order to have this sense there is the need to 
perceive the harm as being undeserved, unjust and immoral, an act that could not 
be prevented by the victim. Bar-Tal et al., 2009, p 232 (see also Viano, 1989). 
That the ideal victim is seen as unjustly harmed exemplifies their vulnerability and/or 
helplessness, justifying their subsequent entitlement to sympathy, support, and even help 
in exacting retribution against those seen as their victimisers (Smyth, 2003: 126).  As the 
object of harm, victims can demonstrate that they exercised no choice or agency in the 
harmful interaction, in contrast to the perpetrators who made the ‘moral choice’ to expose 
the victim to harm (Smyth, 2004: 5).    
The ideal victim image conversely implies that those who do not conform to the 
ascribed characteristics are not only less entitled to victim status, but perhaps that they 
are more ‘guilty’ and therefore deserving of harsh punishment.  The idea that a victim is 
someone who has suffered harm unjustly, or what is more, that someone who perhaps has 
suffered harm justly is not a victim, legitimises attitudes and behaviours towards those 
identified as perpetrators in conflict.  The implications of these constructions and their 
interactions with intergroup processes are discussed in greater detail in the final section 
of this article. 
The favourable image of the ideal victim and binary construction of a victim-
perpetrator dichotomy are crucial components of the victim-perpetrator paradigm.  
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Problems with these simplistic perceptions are numerous, however most groups 
embroiled in intergroup conflict construct themselves and their narratives in accordance 
with the characteristics of the ideal victim, labelling opposing groups as perpetrators and 
subsequently denying that their own actions may have also created victims.  This results 
in a situation where groups hold opposing views of victimhood and responsibility, and 
each believes that only their claim to victim status is rooted in reality.  As the following 
section elucidates, these views also shape group identifications, behaviours and 
intergroup attitudes.  TJ mechanisms such as truth commissions and tribunals struggle to 
accommodate these contradicting constructions in their attempts to engage with ‘victims’ 
and ‘perpetrators’, often reinforcing disparities between groups by privileging certain 
narratives of victimhood over others.  The following section builds upon the discussion 
around prevailing constructions of and meanings attached to victimhood and 
responsibility in conflict, outlining the key areas of intergroup relations and intergroup 
conflict that underpin the victim-perpetrator paradigm. 
 
Intergroup claims to victimhood 
 Social constructions of victimhood cannot be viewed in a vacuum, as the attendant 
beliefs and attitudes associated with these constructions necessarily operate within a 
given social structure.  In particular, intergroup processes which generate a favourable 
image of one’s own group interact with constructions of victimhood, responsibility and 
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violence to shape the victim-perpetrator paradigm.  Intergroup conflict therefore presents 
an exceptionally challenging environment for conflict transformation and TJ where 
conflicting claims about innocence and blame are pervasive and are often woven into the 
fabric of conflict itself.  In these settings, assumptions about victimhood are filtered 
through the lens of group-level social processes which encourage favourable beliefs about 
one’s own group(s) and negative or antagonistic views about relevant other groups. The 
labels of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ in effect become a proxy for wider conflict 
narratives of morality, legitimacy and responsibility.  Because intergroup conflict 
presents a context in which groups experience violence collectively and most in turn 
identify as victims, it seems natural that these groups ‘develop parallel images of self and 
other, except with the sign reversed; that is, the two parties have similarly negative enemy 
images and similarly positive self-images’ (Fisher & Kelman, 2011: 66).  Several key 
areas of intergroup relations theory resonate with perceptions and attitudes driving the 
victim-perpetrator paradigm, including the processes of categorisation and comparison, 
depersonalisation, ethnocentrism and social identity theory.  
The study of intergroup relations explores the social and cognitive processes that 
determine how ‘people behave towards one another as members of different social 
groups’ (Hogg & Abrams, 1988: 32).  Central to intergroup relations is the idea that social 
groups are created through a social categorisation process whereby individuals classify 
and order the social environment as a means to make sense of the world and their role 
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within it (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 2001a).  These groups are the product of a categorisation 
process that renders groups meaningful and salient primarily when distinctions and 
comparisons are made between them (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Abrams, 1988).  Groups 
‘exist by virtue of there being outgroups’ and so, ‘for a collection of people to be a group 
there must, logically, be other people who are not in the group… or people who are in a 
specific outgroup’ (Hogg, 2001: 56).  Once an individual identifies with a group, there is 
‘an accentuation of the perceived similarities between the self and other in-group 
members, and an accentuation of the perceived differences between the self and out-group 
members’ (Stets & Burke, 2000: 225).  It is this ability of intergroup relations to shape 
individuals’ identities in relation to their group membership and their subsequent beliefs, 
attitudes and behaviours towards other groups that renders the approach so useful in 
generating understanding of the complex dynamics in conflict.  The mere fact of 
categorisation is often enough to heighten the perceived similarities within categories and 
exaggerate differences between them (Brewer, 2001a; Fisher & Kelman, 2011), however 
Hogg adds that:  
…the [accentuation] effect is stronger if it is important to distinguish between the 
groups (e.g. you belong to one of the groups) and if the personal dimension is also 
important (e.g. a strongly evaluative dimension like “nice-nasty” or “honest-
dishonest”). 2001, p. 59 
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In settings of conflict, heightened group awareness and the perception of zero sum 
relations with opponent groups produces greater degrees of hostility and therefore greater 
efforts to accentuate comparisons between in-group and out-groups.   
In these fractured relationships, groups focus mainly on aspects of their own 
identity that compare favourably with particular aspects of the opponent group’s identity 
(Schirch, 2001: 150-151).  It is common, then, for these contexts to be characterised by 
intensely ethnocentric attitudes and perceptions (Brewer, 2001).  By accentuating the 
similarities between members of the in-group, a process of depersonalisation occurs 
whereby individuals identifying with a particular group acquire the beliefs, attitudes and 
characteristics associated with the group (Bar-Tal et al., 2009: 235).  The 
depersonalisation phenomenon contributes to the victim-perpetrator paradigm in that 
groups attribute to their own members the characteristics of the ideal victim.  In striving 
for self-esteem and self-enhancement, groups attribute to themselves, through a process 
of depersonalisation, those aspects of the ideal victim construction that offer them 
opportunities for positive comparison against relevant other groups.  In order to create a 
maximum differentiation between themselves and relevant other groups with whom they 
have negative or zero sum relationships, groups further depersonalise members of out-
groups by labelling them collectively as perpetrators who are responsible for their 
victimisation.  These labels are also a function of ethnocentrism, which denotes an in-
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group attachment related to negative out-group attitudes and intergroup differentiations 
(Tajfel, 1982). 
The key motivating factor driving group identification and social comparison can 
be summarised broadly as the desire for a positive self-image which may be described in 
social psychological terms as positive social identity.  Social identity refers to an 
individual’s knowledge that he or she is a member of a particular social group and, 
moreover, indicates that he or she derives some value from that group membership.  The 
basic premise of social identity theory is that ‘a social category… in which one falls, and 
to which one feels one belongs, provides a definition of who one is in terms of the defining 
characteristics of the category’ (Hogg et al., 1995: 259).  Besides providing a coherent 
social structure, social categories and distinctions carry cognitive and emotional 
significance for group members, offering opportunities for evaluative benefits through 
social comparison and ‘a system of orientation for self-reference’ (Tajfel & Turner, 2001: 
101).  Social comparisons between groups become value-laden, offering not only 
descriptions of difference inherent to categorisation, but also evaluations of groups in 
relation to one another where groups and their members may be evaluated as ‘better’ or 
‘worse’ than other groups (Tajfel & Turner, 2001).  Social identities define one’s place 
within the prevailing social structure, serving comparative and evaluative functions that 
impact an individual’s self-esteem as well as prescriptive functions by encouraging 
individuals to incorporate certain group attributes and behaviours into their own self-
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concepts.  Individuals may possess multiple social identities to which they attach a range 
of meanings (Hogg & Abrams, 1988: 19).  If a group can achieve an evaluatively positive 
social identity, its members can access the self-esteem that individuals seek to derive from 
group identification.  The unquestionably favourable constructions of the victim as 
innocent, moral and deserving of care sympathy, and provide a positive self-concept and 
social identity. 
Significantly, social identity theory posits that individuals endeavour to achieve 
or maintain positive social identity, which relies on, among other things, favourable 
comparisons between the in-group and relevant out-groups (Tajfel & Turner, 2001: 101).  
It is the pressure to achieve these favourable comparisons that instigates attempts to 
maximise differentiation between in-group and out-group, which is where the prevailing 
construction of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ as diametric opposites comes into play.  
Because intergroup violence is perceived as a group matter, and individual losses are 
experienced collectively, groups acquire a ‘social identity within the group’s perceptions 
of the events’ (Bar-Tal, 2003: 81).  This identity reinforces ethnocentric attitudes and 
behaviours towards out-groups that may be detrimental to conflict transformation and 
peacebuilding efforts. 
The functionality of relations between groups determines their need to distinguish 
themselves positively at the intergroup level.  Relations between groups that are largely 
positive and peaceful are less likely to be explicitly ethnocentric or contain unfavourable 
  20 
stereotypes and hostile attitudes towards the out-group (Sherif, 2001: 66).  Although some 
scholarship argues that there is not always a clear relationship between in-group 
favouritism and out-group hostility (Brewer, 2001a: 18), studies continue to show that 
even when there is no explicit conflict or competition between groups, or where 
categorisations are arbitrary or imposed, in-group favouring behaviour is still observed 
(Turner, 1975: 5).   
In contexts of division or intergroup conflict, however, boundaries between 
groups are particularly dichotomous and ‘differentiated along a single primary 
categorization, such as ethnicity or religion’ (Brewer, 2001a: 34).  The desire to 
distinguish the in-group from relevant out-groups ‘become[s] heightened as each group 
feels under threat and rallies around increasingly defensive collective identities seeking 
to maintain ontological security’ (Smithey, 2011: 13).  Individuals in these contexts often 
have fewer social identities within their repertoire, so they ‘cherish the identities they 
have, fiercely preserving their positive aspects vis-à-vis outgroups’ (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988: 74).  Relations between groups in conflict may be characterised as zero-sum, and 
therefore beliefs about the inherent nature of each group are filtered through increasingly 
ethnocentric attitudes: ‘The in-group is perceived as positive and superior, whereas out-
groups are seen as inferior and/or threatening’ (Riek et al., 2008: 256).  Importantly, the 
role of ethnocentrism in the victim-perpetrator paradigm demonstrates one of the more 
detrimental consequences of these intergroup constructions of victimhood and 
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responsibility, which is that any number of groups will view themselves as the victims 
and their opponents as the perpetrators.  Often in these zero-sum relations, ‘the very 
existence of the outgroup, or its goals and values, must be seen as a threat to the 
maintenance of the ingroup and to one’s own social identity’ (Brewer, 2001a: 27).  These 
perceptions both instigate ethnocentric intergroup attitudes in conflict and form the 
identities that lend to the intractability of intergroup violence.   
The processes responsible for constructing beliefs about what it means to be a 
victim and who may claim victim status resonate with intergroup processes that help 
groups to develop and maintain favourable views of themselves in comparison to others 
regardless of the objectivity or accuracy of those views.  The desire for a favourable image 
of the in-group, or positive social identity, may be so strong that groups employ cognitive 
strategies to maintain the positive self-concept achieved through the subjective belief 
structures of social comparison. In other words, groups highlight attributes that result in 
positive comparisons in relation to other groups and ignore or minimise those that do not.  
This often involves differentiating and evaluating the in-group from the out-group ‘on 
dimensions on which the ingroup falls at the evaluatively positive pole’ (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988: 23).  Comparisons between in-group and out-group (along favourable dimensions) 
construct and maintain a group’s positive self-image and protect their sense of self-
esteem.  This effect is pronounced during intergroup conflict, where perceptions of the 
in-group as compared to the out-group may be couched in wider socio-political 
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antagonisms.  By labelling in-group members, or, collectively, the in-group itself, as the 
primary victim in conflict, groups may use the construction of the ideal victim and its 
favourable attributes to portray themselves positively and attain maximum differentiation 
from relevant out-groups.   
Intergroup relations processes contribute to the victim-perpetrator paradigm the 
social structures within which groups develop their beliefs, attitudes and behaviours about 
their victimhood and the responsibility of relevant other groups for violence.  These 
structures are informed by dominant social constructions of victimhood, in that groups 
seeking to offer their members positive social identity appropriate the favourable 
attributes associated with the ideal victim and apply them to their members.  In order to 
maximally differentiate their own members from members of the enemy out-group in a 
way that ensures a positive evaluation for the in-group, this social identity as ‘victim’ 
offers a built-in positive comparison against the constructions of a ‘perpetrator’ as 
inescapably negative and wholly responsible for violence and harm.  As this section has 
alluded, the comparisons between groups are not necessarily grounded in objective 
evaluations.  One of the more detrimental implications of the dynamics shaping the 
victim-perpetrator paradigm is that intergroup processes and the related desire to achieve 
positive social identity as ‘victims’ often lead to group-serving explanations that 
perpetuate violence during conflict and prove problematic for peacebuilding and TJ 
mechanisms attempting to address victimhood and responsibility. 
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Group-serving narratives of violence and legitimacy 
While these theories generate a clearer conceptual understanding of how the 
victim-perpetrator paradigm operates, it is useful to illustrate its implications for group 
behaviour and in particular the framing of violence and legitimacy in conflict.  The 
victim-perpetrator paradigm describes a phenomenon in which groups rely on exclusive 
constructions of victimhood to support their favourable self-image and emphasise the 
differentiation between themselves and groups they label as perpetrators.  Being accused 
of or held responsible for atrocities committed in the course of conflict naturally 
compromises a group’s favourable self-image: ‘Even if one did not personally participate 
in these crimes, accusations and war crime trials are experienced as an attack against the 
entire group because they lower the image and dignity of all’ (Oberschall, 2007: 26).  In 
order to protect their favourable self-concept achieved through social comparison and 
subjective belief structures, groups use strategies to reinforce beliefs and attitudes that 
‘are not necessarily accurate reflections of society’ (Hogg, 1996: 67).  There are several 
problematic ways groups frame violence in order to maintain their moral claims to victim 
status that flow from the victim-perpetrator paradigm, which include the justification of 
in-group violence against relevant other groups, denial that out-group members may also 
be victims and the distancing of any groups members who are responsible for violence 
that cannot be justified as ‘legitimate’.   
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Firstly, the construction of the victim as harmed unjustly by an out-group whose 
members are collectively responsible often leads to a justification of violence against out-
groups as legitimate.  Both victims and perpetrators act collectively as proxies for group 
interests and are depersonalised or dehumanised at the intergroup level (Brewer, 2010: 
12; Schirch, 2001).  In intergroup conflict, and specifically in relation to the victim-
perpetrator paradigm, actions and beliefs towards out-groups are a reflection of a wider 
social structure and ‘rely on the symbolic lenses of people in conflict’ (Schirch, 2001: 
147).  In other words, although violence may be committed by individuals, that violence 
‘is initiated and carried out within a social system… [and] the social system provides the 
rationales and the justifications for the violence’ (Bar-Tal, 2003: 79).  Action against the 
in-group is framed as undeserved, and justifies violence committed on behalf of the in-
group.   
Violence on behalf of vulnerable, innocent victims ‘can be construed as self-
defence and can therefore be justified, thereby legitimising violence carried out by or on 
behalf of victims’ (Smyth, 2006: 20).  This becomes a way for groups to frame their 
violence as morally just and to protect their positive social identity.  Without claiming 
victim status, ‘violence becomes too naked, politically inexplicable, and morally 
defensible.  The acquisition of the status of victim becomes an institutionalized way of 
escaping guilt, shame, or responsibility’ (Smyth, 2003: 127).  Continued justification and 
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legitimisation of violence as a function of one’s own victimisation leads to cycles of 
violence which only serve to reinforce groups’ senses of being collectively victimised. 
This justification of in-group violence leads to the attitude that any harm suffered 
by the out-group was legitimate, which counters the construction of the ideal victim as 
unjustly harmed and therefore minimises or denies their claims to victim status.  As 
Oberschall (2007) rightly identifies in relation to what he calls ‘double victim syndrome’, 
claims to in-group victimhood often rely on denial that members of the out-group may 
have valid claims to victimhood in order to interpret their experience and their members 
favourably.  Accepting any blame for wrongdoing undermines groups’ alignment with 
the ideal victim image, and therefore denial of out-group victimhood serves to perpetuate 
an ‘image of blamelessness’ (Lawther, 2013: 166) in dominant constructions of victims.  
This denial may take a number of forms, including a comprehensive denial of any 
evidence that members of the in-group may be responsible for violence against the out-
group or more insidiously, that members of the out-group may not be victims because the 
violence of the in-group was justified, and that those out-group members deserved their 
harm.  In instances where this denial is unsustainable, another tactic to preserve the 
positive social identity of the in-group is the distancing of those in-group members whose 
violence cannot be framed as justified or legitimate.  This entails casting individuals as 
‘deviant’ to allows members of the in-group to claim that ‘bad apples’ or ‘rogue agents’ 
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within their ranks do not represent them collectively and their negative actions do not 
characterise the group as a whole (Hogg, 2001: 67).   
In societies emerging from violent conflict and developing processes to address 
past violence by ‘righting’ past wrongs and addressing grievances in order to repair 
relationships between former adversaries, the denial of groups’ victimhood may 
compound grievance, re-traumatise individuals and guide policies that undermine 
reconciliation by excluding parts of society (Huyse, 2003).  When the ‘equality of 
victimhood’ is denied, it fails to become the uniting experience it could amongst those 
who share similar legacies of harm and suffering.  Instead, victimhood remains fiercely 
divisive and in some cases becomes a foil to continue fighting the conflict within 
structures aimed at consolidating peace. 
 
Conclusion 
The experience of intergroup conflict presents a challenging, complex set of 
dynamics that include group perceptions, beliefs and attitudes about victimhood and 
responsibility that emanate from collective experiences of violence and harm.  The 
victim-perpetrator paradigm is a framework to analyse and understand conflicting 
perceptions about victims and perpetrators in these settings.  Specifically, it presents the 
binary, polarising dichotomy between victims and perpetrators as a construction in which 
victims demonstrate characteristics of innocence and morality, in contrast to perpetrators 
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who are understood as guilty and morally corrupt.  These constructions encourage groups 
in conflict to identify collectively as victims while labelling relevant other groups as 
perpetrators.  At an intergroup level, the prevailing construction of victims as innocent, 
moral and unjustly harmed serves the in-group’s favourable self-image and provides a 
maximum distinctiveness when evaluated against the inherent immorality of the out-
group as perpetrators.  These favourable self-perceptions and positive evaluation against 
the ‘perpetrator’ group reinforce one another to provide group members with claims to 
positive social identity.   
The development of the victim-perpetrator paradigm seeks to contribute to 
examinations of victimhood and its role in violence and transition to peace in a number 
of ways.  On the surface, it offers insights into how perceptions of victimhood and 
responsibility contribute to the intractability of violence in settings where group-level 
conflict is pervasive such as Israel/Palestine.  In these contexts, the paradigm may also 
lend greater understanding to the sociological and social psychological processes 
implicated in perpetuating cycles of violence.  From a more proactive perspective, the 
lessons contained in the victim-perpetrator paradigm may prove useful to scholars and 
practitioners developing innovative ways to end violence as well as others involved in TJ 
interventions after direct violence has largely ended.  Because the victim-perpetrator 
paradigm contains intergroup relations in its makeup, its utility may extend to the 
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significant amount of theorising that already exists on how to intervene on and improve 
hostile or zero sum relationships between groups.  
Finally, the victim-perpetrator paradigm contributes to arguments that seek to 
complicate exclusive, narrow approaches to victimhood and responsibility in conflict.  In 
contrast to the victim-perpetrator paradigm, complex, inclusive approaches to victimhood 
hold that the image of the ideal victim is subjective and does not reflect the ‘messy’ 
realities of intergroup conflict.  These complex constructions accept that individuals from 
all sides of conflict have been impacted by violence in diverse ways, separating beliefs 
about victimhood from assumptions about innocence or responsibility.  This construction, 
which has been called ‘alternative victims’ (Quinney, 1972) or ‘complex victims’ 
(Bouris, 2007) also encourages a more nuanced conception of responsibility, where 
questions of individual and collective responsibility, commission and omission are 
debated and explored.  Complex constructions of victimhood, then, challenge the victim-
perpetrator paradigm by intervening on intergroup processes that render judgements on 
the legitimacy of violence and embracing the complexity presented in intergroup conflicts 
rather than perpetuating the intractable, competing claims to exclusive notions of 
victimhood.  
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